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FEATURE: Gender-Based Persecution
WHERE IS THE PROTECTION?:
A FAILED RESPONSE TO GENDER-BASED PERSECUTION
By Elissa Steglich*Isat across from A., a middle-aged woman
from a country in the Middle East, unsure of
what she would say next and unsure ofwhat
I would say if I were in her position. She had
come to the United States with her husband and
children some time ago. It was not her choice to
come, but rather the election of her husband, who
had controlled her every move since they were
married. I am sure that she was curious as to
what life would be like here, although I never
asked. Perhaps she thought it would give her an
out - provide her with a context whereby she
could work away from the severe physical abuse
and emotional mistreatment she had suffered all
her life and watched her children suffer as well.
If she had sought an escape, she had found it.
The safety net she had probably presumed was
airtight, was in fact, weak and filled with holes.
The decision I had asked her to make
was an impossible one. Would she file for the
uncertain protection of political asylum in order
to possibly avoid the detention of her son who
was being ordered by the U.S. government to
report for special registration?' In seeking
asylum, she would place herself in the hands of
Attorney General John Ashcroft who has sent
clear signals that A. is not a person he wishes to
protect. She would also risk deportation to a
country where her husband's family awaits to
punish her. They have threatened her numerous
times in no uncertain terms. According to them,
her courage in asking the United States for
protection for herself and her children is a
dishonor to the family and an unforgivable act of
defiance and independence.
* Elissa Steglich is Managing Attorney at the
Midwest Immigrant & Human Rights Center.
The views expressed herein are those of the
author.
By not acting, however, she would risk
the detention of her son in the special registration
process. Unfortunately, she is currently in a shelter
with no friends and no access to the thousands
of dollars it may take to obtain the release of her
son. Either choice would risk lives, and
potentially return her and her children to the abuse
away from which she had finally stepped.
Two new developments in immigration
law placedA. in these complicated circumstances.
The first is the new special registration requirement
for males 16 years old and older from certain
Middle Eastern and African nations who arrived
in the United States as nonimmigrants and who
Reports indicate that the
Department of Justice plans to
reverse the policy of protecting
women fleeing gender-related
violence in their home countries.
will be remaining past a date fixed by the
government. Conceived as a strategy to guard
against terrorism within our borders, the Special
Registration program has resulted in the detention
of hundreds of individuals, many ofwhom have
been waiting years for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) (now known as the
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS))
to process their visa and legal residency
paperwork. In order to avoid the registration,
many individuals affected have chosen to move
to Canada. The mass migration, however, has
failed to attract Canada's favor. Many heading
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north are being turned back and placed in
detention facing charges of immigration violations
that can result in deportation.' Where immigration
relief may be available, individuals subject to
special registration are forced to make life-altering
decisions in a very short period of time, often
within days.
The second development is even more
troubling and threatens to leave individuals fleeing
gender-based persecution such as domestic
violence, honor killings, rape as a weapon ofwar,
human trafficking and sexual slavery completely
unprotected. Implementing the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Refugee Convention) and the 1967
Protocol to the Refugee Convention, U.S. law
provides asylum to
individuals fleeing from The pt
or fearing persecution must have b
based on their race,
nationality, religion, a desire to a
political opinion or
membership in a individual
particular social group in religion, na
their country of origin. oninion or
As gender-based per-
secution became more paicular s
recognized, a small but
increasing number of
petitions for asylum based on this form of violence
has appeared before the INS/DHS and the
Immigration Courts. Often, the applicants have
fled situations of extreme violence and brutality;
these mostly women and children have nowhere
else to turn, and the denial ofprotection here can
be a sentence of death.
In the late 1990s, a woman from
Guatemala who had endured disturbing levels of
domestic abuse appealed to an Immigration Judge
for safe haven. While in Guatemala, her husband
beat her repeatedly, threatened to kill her, and
kicked her so hard that he caused a miscarriage.
She sought police assistance time and again, but
her calls were never heeded.
With the Guatemalan government unable
to support and protect her, Rodi Alvarado made
rse
eeni
't ou
fue
iona
miem
ocia
her way to the United States. The Immigration
Judge who heard her case granted her asylum.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the
administrative court with jurisdiction to hear
appeals from the Immigration Courts, reversed
the decision, stripping Ms. Alvarado ofrelief. This
decision, Matter ofR. A., was denounced by
advocates throughout the world as being overly
restrictive and incorrect in its interpretation of
asylum law as applied to gender-related cases.
In one of her final acts as Attorney General, Janet
Reno vacated the BIA's decision in January 2001
and ordered the BIA to reconsider the decision
in the case in light of proposed regulations on
these types of cases. The regulations, which
Reno's Justice Department had authored to
provide clear guidelines
cution itself onhowto consider
WoavaedbY gender-based asylumnotivated by
claims, were never
t against the finalized. As a result,
to herrace., Rodi Alvarado's case is
to her race, stilpending
lity,political This past Feb-
bership in aasthe Department
of Homeland Security
ggroup. assumed control over
most immigration re-
sponsibilities, Attorney
General Ashcroft confirmed that he had
recertified Matter qfR.A. to himself and that his
office was in the process of drafting new
regulations covering gender-based cases.
Reports indicate that the Department of Justice
plans to reverse the policy ofprotecting women
fleeing gender-related violence in their home
countries. While not yet issued, the new
regulations may well curtail the ability ofwomen
and children to obtain asylum protection in the
United States from where they have fled and fear
return based on the range of gender-based
abuses, including domestic violence.
Under the current U.S. law on asylum
protection, in accordance with international
standards, cases of gender-related violence, and
particularly domestic violence, have been
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evaluated similar to other asylum claims, First,
the invidual must establish that she has a "well-
founded fear" of persecution, which may be
presumed from having experienced past
persecution. In addition, the fear must be shown
to be both objectively and subjectively
reasonable, The persecution itself must have been
motivated by a desire to act out against the
individual due to her race, religion, nationality,
political opinion or membership in a particular
social group. The "social group" must be
cognizable, but can be defined by gender and/or
age. Most domestic violene-based asylum
claims have been argued under a social group
theory, comprised of women involved with
spuses who believe in male dominance, women
victims/survivors of domestic abuse, or women
who reject notions of male dominance. Cases
have also been litigated under theories of political
opinion or imputed political opinion, where the
women yae sou ht serv ices or police protection
in their home countries and been frther abused
as a result.
The position of the Department ofiustice
on this issue would be a tragic departure from
guarantees provided for in the Refugee
" The fact that a law has been
enacted to prohibit or denounce
certain persecutory practices will
therefore not in itselfbe sufficient
to determine that the individual'
claim to refugee status is not
valid."
- UNHCR? gender guidelines
Convention and Protocol and specifically
recognized by the United Nations 11igh
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
governments offCanada, the United K ingdom,
Australia and New Zealand. UNI ICR's guidance
on refugee protection based on gender-related
persecution is clear: that it is important "to ensure
that proper consideration is given to women
claimants in refugee status determination
procedures and that the range of gender-related
claims are recognized as such" Further,
There is no doubt that rape and other
forms of gender-related violence, such as
dowry-related violence, female genital
mutila-tion, domestic violence and
trafficking are acts which inflict severe
pain and suffering - both mental and
physical -and which have been used as
forms of persecution, whether perpetrat-
ed by State or private actorsi
Importantly, the Refugee Convention and
Protocol provides protection not only to those
individuals fleeing from or fearing State-
sponsored violence on account of the five
enumerated grounds, but also to those fleeing
from a privat agent ofpersecution aga whom
the government cannot, or will not, properly
protect the individual, U.S. law is likewise clea
on this point, considenn as1u Pctitons where
the persecutor is someone that the government
is "unable or unwilling to control"6 As the
UN HCR gender guidelines highlight,
Even though a particular state may have
prohibited a persecuto practice (e.g.
female genital mutilation the State may
nevertheless continue to condone or
tolerate the practice, or may not be able
to stop the practice effectively. ... The
fact that a law has been enacted to
prohibit or denounce certain persecutory
practices will therefore not in itself be
suflicient to determine that the individuals
claim to refugee status is not valid.7
In most cases of gender-related violence, the
persecutor will be a private individual -the spouse
or family member of the individual seeking
protection. It is critical, therefore, that the law
reflects and responds to the nature of that
persecution. Rodi Alvarez was denied
c n.
( ninen  ag -
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IF IT AIN'T BROKE, Fix IT?:
ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF AREN V LISLE
ON ILLINOIS ZONING LAW
By Victor P. Filippini, Jr., Barbara A. Adams, and
Elliot M. Regenstein*
When the Illinois Supreme Courtagreed to review the case ofPeopleex rel. Klaeren v. Village ofLisle,I
most observers expected the Court to clarify the
procedural rights associated with local public
hearings in Illinois. Although the Supreme Court
did address public hearing procedures, the more
BACKGROUND:
THE CASE AND TiE LAW
n Klaeren, landowners living adjacent to a
proposed Meijer development challenged
the procedure by which the Village of Lisle
approved the development. Specifically, Lisle
significant and startling
aspect of its decision
was the abandonment
of more than 40 years
ofprecedent through its
proclamation that
"municipalbodies actin
administrative or quasi-
judicial capacities when
those bodies conduct
zoning hearings
concerning a special
use petition." 2
Certainly, the
mere fact that a well-
established precedent
has been overturned is
... in filing suit, the
plaintiffs did not challenge
the substance of Lisle's
zoning decisions. Rather, the
basis for their zoning
challenge was that the public
hearing process did not
afford them an adequate
opportunity to be heard.
reason enough to take notice ofajudicial decision.
When that decision will literally affect every local
government in Illinois that has zoning authority,
and every property owner or developer who may
seek a special use permit in connection with the
use and development of a property, there is even
more reason to pay attention. But when such a
dramatic turnabout in the law occurs for no
apparent reason, it is time to do more than read
the Court's opinion; it is time to question it.
used the uncommon
procedure of a joint
hearing of its Zoning
Board ofAppeals, Plan
Commission, and
Board of Trustees on
the proposed develop-
ment to hear evidence
on the requested
annexation, annexation
agreement, rezoning,
and special use pennits
for a planned develop-
ment and for a gas
station. Over 500
people attended the
public hearing. The
mayor of Lisle presided at the hearing, allowing
the petitioners to make a full presentation of their
case but setting a two-minute time limit on all
* Victor P. Filippini, Jr. and Barbara A. Adams are part-
ners and Elliot M. Regenstein is an associate of the
Chicago office of Holland & Knight, LLC. They prin-
cipally practice in local government law and land use
law, representing many Chicago area municipalities and
governmental agencies.
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speakers from the audience - a limitation that
prevented a citizen group from making a prepared
presentation on behalf of 2,000 residents who
had signed a petition. The mayor also barred
citizens from presenting poster board exhibits as
evidence. Moreover, the mayor prohibited any
of the citizens from cross-examining any of the
petitioner's witnesses.'
After the joint hearing was adjourned,
the Plan Commission and Zoning Board of
Appeals each considered the evidence relating
to the requested planned development and gas
station special use permits, and both of these
bodies ultimately recommended that the special
use permits should be denied.4 Nevertheless,
the Village Board in Lisle decided not to follow
the recommendations of the Plan Commission
and Zoning Board of Appeals, and it approved
the annexation and zoning petitions needed to
permit the Meijer development to proceed.
The plaintiffs, disappointed residents of
Lisle, filed their lawsuit to prevent the Meijer
development from proceeding. The trial court
held a preliminary injunction hearing at which at
least ten witnesses testified to matters both within
and without the public hearing record. Following
the hearing, the trial court granted a preliminary
injunction from which the case was appealed.'
Significantly, in filing suit, the plaintiffs did not
challenge the substance of Lisle's zoning
decisions. Rather, the basis for their zoning
challenge was that the public hearing process did
not afford them an adequate opportunity to be
heard.6
In reviewing this case, the Appellate
Court of Illinois, Second District, held that the
procedures used at the public hearing in Lisle
violated the public hearing rights of the adjacent
landowners. In doing so, the Second District
determined that all public hearings "in all
municipalities" must allow not only the right of
cross-examination, but the "full panoply of rights"
to subpoena witnesses, present witnesses, and
request continuances for purposes of developing
rebuttal evidence.'
The Supreme Court expressly rejected
the Second District's conclusion that any public
hearing before any municipal body required the
municipal body to provide the full spectrum of
rights identified by the Second District. The
Supreme Court held that the Second District had
construed the phrase "public hearing" too
broadly.' The Supreme Court properly
distinguished between the process necessary at
"legislative" hearings and "quasi-judicial" or
adjudicative hearings, noting that quasi-judicial
hearings must provide certain procedures for
public participation not required for legislative
hearings.
It was the next step of the Court's
analysis that turned Illinois zoning law on its head.
The Court decided that, when considering special
use permits, the corporate authorities of
municipalities were acting in a quasi-judicial rather
than legislative capacity. 0 This overturned the
longstanding rule in Illinois that zoning decisions
of a local governing board are legislative.I' The
Supreme Court supported its decision that special
use permits are adjudicative hearings by noting
that "the property rights ofthe interested parties
are at issue."12 Of course, the same could be
said of nearly every zoning decision and many
other matters coming before municipalities,
including annexations (which do not ordinarily
require public hearings) and annexation
agreements. Thus, the Court's new litmus test
for distinguishing between legislative and
adjudicative decisions of a local governing body
is at best unclear, and will lead to many false
positives if applied as the Court directed."
Ironically, the Court's decision was
largely unnecessary for several reasons. First,
there is no constitutional requirement for a public
hearing in the zoning or annexation context.14
Thus, the only rights that the plaintiffs had were
the public hearing rights provided by statute. With
respect to the special use permits, the plaintiffs
received exactly the outcome they sought from
the hearing bodies: negative recommendations.
Moreover, the plaintiffs did not challenge the
substantive decision of the Village Board, only
the procedural process. Thus, the Court could
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REPORTER SPRING 2003PAGE, 11 I
5
Steglich: Where is the Protection?: A Failed Response to Gender-Based Perse
Published by LAW eCommons, 2003
